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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. economy endured a lurid plunge in 2001.  By March, the 
U.S. economy had descended into its first recession in almost a 
decade.1  In 2001, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell seven 
percent, the largest percentage drop since 1981,2 while the Nasdaq 
composite fell over twenty-one percent.3  Unemployment rates rose 
each month in the latter half of 2001, culminating at a 5.8% 
unemployment rate, the highest level of unemployment since April of 
1995.4  Compounding these troubling economic realities, the average 
household owed more than $8,000 in credit-card debt at the end of 
2001.5  Such large amounts of debt can be an unmanageable burden 
                                                          
 1. See Economists Call It Recession, CNNMONEY, at http://money.cnn.com/2001/ 
11/26/economy/recession/index.htm (Nov. 26, 2001) (citing a report published by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research that based its findings on monthly 
employment, industrial production, incomes, and sales data) (on file with the 
American University Law Review). 
 2. See E.S. Browning, After Two Years of Suffering, Investors Hope for a Rebound, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2002, at A1 (noting that the Dow Jones industrial average fell 
7.1% during 2001, the largest percentage decline for the Dow since 1981, when the 
index fell 9.23%), available at http://interactive.wsj.com/articles/SB1009575912 
654276400.htm. 
 3. See id. (stating that the 21.05% drop in the Nasdaq Composite Index in 2001 
was less than the 39.29% drop in 2000), available at http://interactive.wsj.com 
/articles/SB1009575912654276400.htm. 
 4. See U.S. Unemployment Rises, CNNMONEY, at http://money.cnn.com/2002/ 
01/04/economy/economy (Jan. 4, 2002) (noting that the Labor Department’s 
statistics indicate that the economy has lost 1.4 million jobs since March 2001) (on 
file with the American University Law Review). 
 5. See Jeanie Sahadi, Debt Overload:  5 Red Flags, CNNMONEY, at http://money. 
cnn.com/2001/10/07/debt/q_debt/ (Oct. 8, 2001) (quoting a CardWeb.com 
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for individuals facing layoffs incident to the economic slowdown. 
The bankruptcy system provides debtors with relief from debt’s 
harsh realities,6 but changes to the bankruptcy laws are coming.  The 
107th Congress is in the final stages of enacting the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 2001(“Reform Act”),7 an ambitious overhaul of the 
U.S. bankruptcy system.8  Final passage of the Reform Act merely 
requires reconciliation of the House and Senate versions of the bill,9 
which are substantially “similar”10 and President Bush’s “promised” 
signature.11  
Because of the economic downturn of 2001, bankruptcy reforms 
will affect the average consumer.  The Reform Act presents a marked 
change in the bankruptcy field for consumer debtors.  For example, 
the Reform Act creates the “means test,”12 and an eligibility 
requirement under Chapter 7 bankruptcy,13 which will prevent 
                                                          
household study that found the average credit card balance per U.S. household 
equaled $8,523) (on file with the American University Law Review).  According to a 
Myvesta.org study, the average credit card balance per person was $2,814.  Id. 
 6. See discussion infra Part I.C (noting how the U.S. bankruptcy system provides 
relief to debtors by discharging much of their indebtedness). 
 7. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong. (2001), currently 
referred to as the Bankruptcy Abuse and Prevention Act of 2002.  H.R. 333, 107th 
Cong. (2002). 
 8. See Peter Spero, Impact of Bankruptcy Reform Legislation on Asset Protection, 28 
EST. PLAN. 291, 291 (2001) (stating that passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
2001 is a “virtual certainty,” and noting that both the House and Senate have passed 
similar versions and that the “President has said that he will sign it.”). 
 9. See generally  S. 420. 
 10. See id. (noting the similarities between the House and Senate versions of the 
Reform Act).  See generally Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 11. See W. Clarkson McDow, Jr., The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 and Its Impact on 
Consumer Lawyers, 13 Aug. S.C. LAW. 32, 33 (July/Aug. 2001) (stating that as of 
August, 2001, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 has passed both Houses of 
Congress and the “President has promised to sign it.”).  The House-Senate 
conference committee on the bankruptcy legislation was originally scheduled to 
convene on September 12, 2001, but because of the events of September 11, they did 
not convene until November 14, 2001.  The committee’s chairman, House Judiciary 
Chairman James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), noted that the Reform Act probably would 
not be completed by the Conference Committee until 2002.  American Bankruptcy 
Institute, Today’s Bankruptcy Headlines:  Sept. 11 Plays Role in Opinions During 
Bankruptcy Panel Meeting, Daily Bankruptcy Review, at http://www.abiworld.org/ 
headlines/TODAY.html (Nov. 15, 2001) (on file with the American University Law 
Review).  Currently, an agreed upon conference committee report is tied up in the 
House of Representatives because of a disagreement regarding an abortion provision 
entirely unrelated to the analysis of this Comment.  See American Bankruptcy 
Institute, Today’s Bankruptcy Headlines:  Bankruptcy “Agreement” Hits New Snag in 
House, Daily Bankruptcy Review, at http://www.abiworld.org/headlines/02july29. 
html (July 29, 2002) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 12. See discussion infra Part II.B.1 (detailing the Reform Act’s means test). 
 13. Chapter 7 bankruptcy is a liquidation proceeding in which a trustee collects 
the debtor’s nonexempt assets, converts them to cash, and pays the claims of the 
debtor’s creditors with this cash.  See JOHN H. WILLIAMSON, THE ATTORNEY’S 
HANDBOOK ON SMALL BUSINESS REORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 11 20 (Argyle Pub. 
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debtors with the financial ability to repay a portion of their debt from 
receiving an unconditional discharge under Chapter 7.14  
Although limiting access to bankruptcy relief at a time of economic 
uncertainty seems counterintuitive, this reform is a response to what 
some observers have called a “bankruptcy crisis” caused by rampant 
debtor abuse of the bankruptcy system.15  The data supporting that 
contention is compelling.  In the 1990s the United States 
experienced its largest and longest period of economic growth,16 
coupled with record low unemployment rates,17 yet personal 
bankruptcy filings rose seventy-two percent between 1994 and 1998.18  
During that same period of increased personal filings, corporate 
bankruptcy filings steadily declined.19 
Therein lies the paradox:  a booming economy and increasing 
personal bankruptcy filings.  The Reform Act is premised on the 
belief that this paradox exists because current consumer bankruptcy 
laws are too lenient, allowing individuals with future earnings 
potential to seek a full discharge of large unsecured debts without 
any future recourse or consequences.20  To limit abuse of the 
                                                          
5th ed. 1998) (noting that if debtors do not wish to liquidate their assets, they should 
file for a reorganization of their debts under Chapter 13). 
 14. See discussion infra Part II.B.1; see also McDow, supra note 11, at 33 (noting 
the change from the current subjective substantial abuse test under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 707(b) to a proposed objective means test).  Those debtors who fail to meet the 
proposed eligibility requirements will either have their filing dismissed or converted 
to a Chapter 13 filing, thereby requiring them to repay a portion of their debt 
pursuant to a Chapter 13 plan.  See Spero, supra note 8, at 291 (discussing reports 
that, as a general rule, families of four with income of $52,000 would be required to 
file under Chapter 13). 
 15. See generally Gordon Bermant & Ed Flynn, Consumer Filings in a Complex 
Economy, 18 Jan. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22 (Dec./Jan. 2000) (arguing that the substantial 
increase in personal bankruptcy filings is due to debtor abuse as opposed to 
traditional causal explanations like recession, depression, inflation, or high 
unemployment). 
 16. See supra note 1 (noting the recession that started in March ended a ten-year 
period of economic expansion, the longest in U.S. history, topping a growth period 
of eight years and ten months that took place in the 1960s). 
 17. According to the Bureau of Labor’s Statistics, between 1998-99, the “civilian 
labor force grew 1.3 million and unemployment fell to 4.2 percent.”  Bermant & 
Flynn, supra note 15, at 22. 
 18. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-3, pt. 1, at 5 (2001) (citing data provided by the 
Administrative Office for United States Courts). 
 19. See U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980-2001 (Business, Non-Business, Total), ABI 
WORLD, at http://www.abiworld.org/stats/1980annual.html (last visited Apr. 14, 
2002) (providing data that shows a fifty percent decline in business filings between 
1990-2000 from 71,549 filings in 1991 to 35,472 filings in 2000 as opposed to non-
business filings which have almost doubled from 718,107 in 1990 to 1,217,972 in 
2000) (on file with the American University Law Review); see also Bermant & Flynn, 
supra note 15, at 22 (noting that the recent fall in Chapter 11 filings led to suspicion 
of serious flaws in the consumer bankruptcy system that present inappropriate 
temptations to prospective filers). 
 20. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the paradox of the current bankruptcy 
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bankruptcy system, Congress has proposed that a means test be 
utilized to determine eligibility for Chapter 7 relief.21 
This Comment addresses the bankruptcy eligibility aspects of the 
Reform Act and analyzes them in practical, legal, equitable, and 
economic contexts.  Part I outlines the historical evolution of the 
eligibility standard under the consumer bankruptcy system in the 
United States.  Part II details how the Reform Act will affect 
consumers’ current eligibility for bankruptcy protection.  Part III 
analyzes these details and presents legal, equitable, and economic 
reasons for passing the Reform Act.  Finally, Part IV concludes by 
recommending passage of the Reform Act because it will unify 
current consumer bankruptcy law, prevent morally repugnant and 
socially undesirable discharges of consumer debt, and provide a long-
term economic stimulus to the ailing U.S. economy by ensuring the 
availability of affordable consumer credit.  
I.  THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF ELIGIBILITY UNDER THE 
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 
A typical personal bankruptcy action involves a debtor voluntarily 
or involuntarily liquidating all pre-determined non-exempt assets in 
favor of creditors in return for a discharge of debts owed to these 
creditors.22  Evolving U.S. bankruptcy laws have addressed each aspect 
of the typical personal bankruptcy filing in different ways.23 
A. The Creation and Early Development of Bankruptcy Law                         
in the United States 
Congress’ ability to formulate a bankruptcy system was first 
enunciated in 1787, in the U.S. Constitution.24  In 1800, the first 
American bankruptcy law25 enacted under this charge copied the 
                                                          
crisis); see also S. REP. NO. 106-49, at 3 (1999) (“It is the strong view of the [Senate 
Judiciary] Committee that the Bankruptcy Code’s generous, no-questions-asked 
policy of providing complete debt forgiveness under chapter [sic] 7 without serious 
consideration of a bankrupt’s ability to repay is deeply flawed and encourages a lack 
of personal responsibility.”). 
 21. See discussion infra Part II (noting that the means test, by requiring  
financially able debtors to repay a portion of their debt, will prevent debtors from 
abusing the bankruptcy system). 
 22. See Richard E. Coulson, Consumer Abuse of Bankruptcy:  An Evolving Philosophy of 
Debtor Qualifications for Bankruptcy Discharge, 62 ALB. L. REV. 467, 470-71 (1998) 
(describing a “traditional Chapter 7 scenario”). 
 23. See id. (indicating that the roles of the in a traditional Chapter 7 scenario vary 
according to the applicable law at the time of the filing); see also discussion infra Parts 
I.A, I.B, I.C. 
 24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (stating that Congress has the right to establish 
“uniform laws of bankruptcy”). 
 25. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). 
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English bankruptcy law of that time.26  The American law was “limited 
to creditor-initiated petitions against merchants,” thereby having little 
applicability to the average consumer debtor.27 
Congress quickly repealed the first law in 1803, but passed another 
in 1841.28  The second law made bankruptcy available to voluntary 
debtors for the first time.29  The debtor entering bankruptcy was 
required to surrender all non-exempt property for liquidation to pay 
off as much of his debts as the liquidated assets would allow.30  In 
exchange, all of the debtor’s debts would be “discharged.”31  
However, if a majority of the creditors—in number or in value— 
holding proven debts objected, they could deny the discharge.32 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 (“1867 Act”)33 slightly modified these 
requirements.34  Pursuant to the 1867 Act, creditor consent was not 
required for filings before June 1, 1868.35  If the debtor’s non-exempt 
assets did not satisfy a fifty percent or larger portion of the total debt, 
a discharge would still require the consent of a majority—in either 
number or value—of the creditors.36  
                                                          
 26. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 1-2 (1993) (describing the 
similarities between the first codified American bankruptcy law and the English 
version as essentially being procedural in nature). 
 27. Id. at 1. 
 28. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 473 (stating that the second attempt at a 
codified bankruptcy law in the United States was a direct response to the economic 
panic of 1837). 
 29. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 349 (1991) (maintaining that the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was 
the “first time in Anglo-American jurisprudence” in which voluntary bankruptcy was 
allowed). 
 30. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 473-74 (explaining that the exempt property 
included household and kitchen furniture and other articles judged necessary, such 
as clothing, but these items were not to exceed $300). 
 31. See id. at 474 (“The 1841 discharge included all the debts, if, as before, the 
debtor surrendered his property, complied with all court orders, and conformed 
with the Act.”). 
 32. See id. (recognizing that a debtor could demand a jury trial to determine 
whether his filing should be approved despite creditors’ objections if it appeared that 
the debtor made a full disclosure of his assets and surrendered all of his estate). 
 33. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, §§ 4972-5132, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 
1878). 
 34. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 474-76 (noting that like the 1841 Bankruptcy 
Act, the 1867 Act was a response to an economic panic in 1857). 
 35. See id. at 476 (arguing the 1867 Act, while short lived, was a rather 
sophisticated form of legislation and foreshadowed future developments in 
bankruptcy law in 1898). 
 36. See Tabb, supra note 29, at 357 (explaining that amendments made in 1874 
provided that a voluntary debtor whose non-exempt assets paid less than thirty 
percent of the proven claims would not be discharged unless one-fourth of the 
creditors in number and one-third in value consented as opposed to the majority of 
creditors required to consent under the original 1867 language). 
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In 1898, a “fully modern bankruptcy act” was enacted.37  The law 
recognized for the first time the public interest in granting a 
discharge to “honest but unfortunate” debtors.38  Congress promoted 
the public interest by eliminating the long-standing requirements of 
either creditor consent or a minimum dividend as a prerequisite for 
obtaining a discharge.39  The 1898 Act codified the conditions under 
which a discharge would not be granted.40  It also defined particular 
types of debts that were “non-dischargeable”41 as essentially exempt 
from a discharge.42  
B. The Advent of Repayment Plans 
In the aforementioned consumer bankruptcy laws, the emphasis 
was on the debtor receiving a fresh start after liquidation of his 
assets.43  Changes made by the Chandler Act of 1938,44 however, made 
a debtor’s future potential income an issue.45  It created a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy option entitled “Wage Earners’ Plans”46 that allowed 
consumer debtors to adjust their debts by using future income.47  The 
Wage Earners’ Plans detailed and prioritized a debtor’s debt by 
                                                          
 37. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).  See Coulson, supra 
note 22, at 477 (describing the 1898 Bankruptcy Act). 
 38. See Tabb, supra note 29, at 364-65 (stating that the underlying theory behind 
recognizing the public interest in discharging “honest but unfortunate” debtors is 
that “society as a whole benefits when an overburdened debtor is freed from the 
oppressive weight of accumulated debt,” thereby allowing a debtor to “resume his or 
her place as a productive member of society.”). 
 39. See id. (suggesting that “[t]his innovation marked as much as anything else 
the arrival of the ‘modern’ American pro-debtor discharge policy”). 
 40. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 481 (stating that “[o]n a debtor’s application, 
the court was to discharge the debtor unless she committed a bankruptcy crime, or, 
with fraudulent intent, destroyed, concealed or failed to keep books from which the 
debtor’s true financial condition could be determined.”). 
 41. See id. at 482 (defining non-dischargeable debt as debts for which the debtor 
remains obligated despite bankruptcy). 
 42. See id. (observing that such non-dischargeable debts included “debts:  (1) for 
taxes; (2) based on judgments for fraud, false pretense, or willful and malicious 
injuries; (3) not properly scheduled so the creditor could timely file a claim; or 
(4) created by ‘fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting 
as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity.’”). 
 43. See id. at 493 (stating that “[i]n non-commercial bankruptcies, emphasis in 
the past [had] been on discharge, rather than on distribution to creditors”). 
 44. See Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 930-41 (repealed 1978) 
(creating the Wage Earners’ Plans). 
 45. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 493 (discussing the advent of a new policy in 
which future assets, specifically future earnings, should be procured and used to pay 
creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding if available). 
 46. Walter Chandler, The Wage Earners’ Plan:  Its Purpose, 15 VAND. L. REV. 169 
(1961).  The 1938 Chandler Act was named after Walter Chandler.  Id. 
 47. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 493 (“Chapter 13 was the first carefully 
considered effort to address the need for some consumer debtors to adjust their 
debts by using future income.”) 
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applying the debtor’s future income to pay off all or a portion of the 
debt according to set priorities while leaving “a sufficient amount . . . 
for the support of his family and himself.”48  The plans required the 
consent of a majority of the creditors with claims, and of each 
affected, secured creditor.49  The debtor received his discharge upon 
execution of the plan subject to his satisfactory compliance with the 
plan throughout its duration.50 
The Chapter 13 option was never the “preferred mode” 51 for most 
consumer debtors when compared to the more conventional option 
of liquidation of a debtor’s assets option.52  Most debtors chose to free 
their future earnings from prior credit claims by filing for a voluntary 
liquidation, regardless of whether their future earnings could pay 
down some, if not all, of their debt.53  This phenomenon of consumer 
debt avoidance would become the justification for the creditors’ 
rallying cry for bankruptcy reform, eventually culminating in the 
passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.54 
C. The Next Phase of U.S. Bankruptcy Law:  The Push for a Mandatory 
Chapter 13 and the Advent of Substantial Abuse 
In the 1960s, the credit industry began a push to overhaul the 
bankruptcy system by mandating that all consumer debtors use 
Chapter 13 to discharge debt.55 In 1964, that overhaul led to the 
                                                          
. 48. Chandler, supra note 46, at 169-70. 
 49. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 494 (explaining that “[t]he consent of a 
majority of the proven claims in amount and number, and of each affected secured 
creditor was necessary for confirmation.”). 
 50. See id. (highlighting that “after three years, if the court found that the plan 
payments had not been completed ‘due to circumstances for which [the debtor] 
could not be justly held accountable’” the discharge would remain in effect) (citing 
Chandler Act of 1938, § 661, 52 Stat. at 936). 
 51. Id. at 495 (citing annual reports from the Director of the Administrations 
Office of the United States Courts indicating that in 1961, only fifteen percent of the 
non-business filings were for wage earner plans). 
 52. See id. (recognizing that in the more conventional liquidation of assets 
option, a creditor could not touch a debtor’s future earnings unless:  (1) a debt was 
determined to be nondischargeable, (2) a discharge was denied, (3) there was an 
express agreement allowing creditors access thereto). 
 53. See id. at 495-96 (noting that an individual with nominal assets and a 
significant future earnings potential could choose to liquidate his nominal assets, 
repay his creditors to a nominal extent while receiving a discharge, and prevent 
access to his large future earning ability). 
 54. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the advent of “substantial abuse” and its 
application to potentially abusive debtors). 
 55. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 500 (noting that the credit industry’s efforts to 
amend the bankruptcy laws were similar to legislation in the 1930s that was 
denounced as “un-American”); Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual 
Debtor—and a Modest Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 
809, 821 (1983) (stating that the proposed legislation resembled the English practice 
of conditional or suspended discharge). 
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introduction of House Bill 12,784,56 which would have amended the 
bankruptcy laws to require a wage earning debtor, seeking relief 
under a liquidation plan, to show that relief under Chapter 13 would 
be inadequate.57  However, House Bill 12,784 never emerged from 
committee.58  The credit industry introduced identical legislation in 
196559 and 1967,60 but those pieces of legislation also failed to emerge 
from committee.  Similarly, in 1965, legislation was introduced in the 
Senate,61 which would have created a new section in the bankruptcy 
laws mandating that debtors file under Chapter 13.62  The Senate Bill 
also failed to gain enough support to pass committee.63 
Even though none of the mandatory Chapter 13 requirements 
became law, the credit industry’s pressure on Congress led to the 
creation of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws (“Commission”) to 
“study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend changes” for establishing a 
uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States.64  One 
of the Commission’s purposes was to study legislative solutions to 
handle the increasing number of consumer bankruptcies.65  In 1973, 
after a two-year study, the Commission reported its findings on the 
feasibility of a mandatory Chapter 13 for all consumer debtors.66  The 
Commission soundly rejected a mandatory Chapter 13 law,67 citing 
among other reasons that such a requirement “would be almost 
                                                          
 56. See H.R. 12,784, 88th Cong. (1964) (stating that the judge or referee shall 
determine at the first meeting of creditors whether the wage earning debtor has 
shown that adequate relief cannot be obtained under Chapter 13). 
 57. See id. (permitting non-wage earning debtors and wage earning debtors who 
showed that Chapter 13 relief is inadequate to proceed under a liquidation plan). 
 58. Coulson, supra note 22, at 500; Countryman, supra note 55, at 821. 
 59. H.R. 292, 89th Cong. (1965). 
 60. H.R. 1057, 90th Cong. (1967); H.R. 5771, 90th Cong. (1967). 
 61. S. 613, 89th Cong. (1965). 
 62. See id. (authorizing the court “upon application of any creditor or upon its 
own motion, whenever it determines it to be feasible and desirable, and for the best 
interests of the creditors, [to] order any voluntary bankrupt who is receiving salary or 
wages to file a petition under  . . . [Chapter 13]”). 
 63. Coulson, supra note 22, at 500.  See Countryman, supra note 55, at 821 (noting 
that further attempts to enact similar legislation failed in the 1970s). 
 64. See Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, § 1(b), 84 Stat. 468, 468 (stating 
that during the study the Commission shall consider basic philosophy of bankruptcy, 
causes of bankruptcy, and alternatives to the bankruptcy system). 
 65. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-927 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3559, 3560 
(stating that the number of bankruptcies over the past twenty years increased by 
1000% and consumer bankruptcies accounted for 90% of that increase). 
 66. See Report of the Commission of the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137 (1973), reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, at App. Pt. 4-409 
(Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. Rev. 2001) (Appendix 4(c)) (reporting that the 
Commission reviewed Chapter 13 usage in areas in which this type of relief was most 
extensively used, such as Alabama, Ohio, California, Georgia, Tennessee, Kansas, and 
Maine). 
 67. See id. at App. Pt. 4, 412 (stating that new bankruptcy laws should promote 
Chapter 13 so that debtors know all available relief). 
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bound to encourage debtors to change employment and, if necessary, 
to move to another area to escape the importuning calls and 
correspondence of his creditors.”68  As a result of the Commission’s 
conclusions, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (“1978 Act”)69 did 
not include any mandatory Chapter 13 provisions.70 
The credit industry responded to the 1978 Act by pushing to 
reform what creditors perceived to be “an undue bias toward 
bankrupts.”71  Similar to the credit industry’s push in the 1960s to 
mandate Chapter 13, legislation was introduced to restrict access to 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy.72  The proposed legislation in the House73 and 
Senate74 sought to limit Chapter 7 to debtors who could not afford to 
pay a reasonable amount of their debts pursuant to a Chapter 13 
plan.75 
Although neither piece of legislation immediately changed the use 
of Chapter 13,76 a study by Robert W. Johnson,77 a professor at Purdue 
University’s Credit Research Center (“Purdue Study”), added fuel to 
the credit union’s building fire.78  The Purdue Study concluded that 
$1.1 billion of the debt discharged annually under Chapter 7 could 
be repaid by debtors’ future income.79  While critics attacked the 
                                                          
 68. See id. at App. Pt. 4, 411-12 (stating that a mandatory Chapter 13 plan would 
force a debtor and the debtor’s family to live within the constraints of the plan to the 
end and thus appeared to be debtor peonage). 
 69. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as 
amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
 70. Coulson, supra note 22, at 501. 
 71. Paul M. Black & Michael J. Herbert, Bankcard’s Revenge:  A Critique of the 1984 
Consumer Credit Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 845 (1985).  
The 1978 Act “was branded a debtor’s paradise practically beckoning borrowers to 
shed their debts painlessly and needlessly.” Id. 
 72. Coulson, supra note 22, at 501.  Two years after the enactment of the 1978 
Act, legislation was introduced in the House and Senate limiting debtors access to 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  Id.  The 1978 Act named the liquidation of assets form of 
bankruptcy as Chapter 7.  Act of Nov. 6, 1978, § 721, 92 Stat. at 2606. 
 73. See H.R. 4786, 97th Cong. § 2 (1981) (providing that “an individual may be a 
debtor under chapter 7 . . . only if such individual cannot pay a reasonable portion of 
his debts out of anticipated future income”). 
 74. See S. 2000, 97th Cong. § 2(c) (1981) (prohibiting individuals from being a 
debtor under Chapter 7 if they could pay “a substantial percentage of the 
outstanding debt” out of anticipated future income). 
 75. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 501-02 (noting that the definitions in the 
legislation did not provide much guidance on fluid concepts, such as anticipated 
future income). 
 76. See id. at 502 (indicating that Congress did not pass either bill due to the lack 
of uniform support for bankruptcy reform at that time). 
 77. 1 CREDIT RES. CTR., PURDUE UNIV., CONSUMER BANKR. STUDY 88-91 (1982).  
The study asserted that the 1978 Act had an adverse financial impact on the credit 
industry.  Id. 
 78. See Countryman, supra note 55, at 822 (describing the credit industry’s 
influence on the Purdue Study). 
 79. See id. (concluding that 33.1% of bankruptcy debtors could have repaid their 
debts in full); see also John M. Czarnetzky, The Individual and Failure:  A Theory of the 
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validity of this conclusion,80 the momentum of the credit industry’s 
campaign continued when the American Bar Association endorsed 
legislation allowing creditors to seek dismissal of Chapter 7 petitions 
when the debtor could pay a reasonable portion of his debts out of 
future income.81 
The credit industry’s momentum resulted in Senate Bill 2000 being 
“reintroduced”82 in February of 1983 as Senate Bill 445.83  Originally, 
Senate Bill 445, like Senate Bill 2000, contained language limiting  
Chapter 7 bankruptcy to individuals who could not pay a reasonable 
portion of their debts.84  By the time Senate Bill 445 was reported by 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, the Chapter 7 language 
had been replaced with a new “substantial abuse” test.85  The new test 
stated that a court may dismiss a motion for discharge under Chapter 
7 if granting relief would be a substantial abuse of Chapter 7.86  
Meanwhile, companion legislation in the House included similar 
language.87  The substantial abuse test was eventually codified in 1984 
as an amendment to the 1978 Act.88  The obfuscated origins of the 
                                                          
Bankruptcy Discharge, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 393, 440-41 (2000) (explaining that the Purdue 
Study involved a questionnaire study in two judicial districts in ten states with willing 
respondents answering a series of follow-up questions). 
 80. See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge:  An 
Analysis of the Creditors’ Data, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1091, 1104-08 (1983) (arguing that the 
Purdue Study’s methodology created a selection bias that raised significant concerns 
about the data used in the conclusions); Elizabeth Warren, Reducing Bankruptcy 
Protection for Consumers:  A Response, 72 GEO. L.J. 1333, 1338-39 (1984) (noting that the 
Purdue Study lacked crucial expertise, was designed incorrectly, gathered its data 
improperly, misanalyzed the statistical data, and drew erroneous and biased 
inferences from the data analysis). 
 81. See Consumer Bankruptcy Subcommittee of the Committee on Consumer Financial 
Services of the American Bar Association, 2 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 239, 259 (1982) 
(recommending the dismissal of Chapter 7 cases when the debtor is able to allocate 
future earnings to pay a reasonable portion of his debts).  The problem of Chapter 7 
bankruptcy is that it is a form of equitable relief and unavailable for the asking.  Id. 
 82. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 503 (explaining that the reintroduced bill 
sought to limit Chapter 7 to individuals who could not pay a reasonable portion of 
their debts out of future income). 
 83. Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1983, S. 445, 98th Cong. (1983). 
 84. See David L. Balser, Note, Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code:  A Roadmap With 
a Proposed Standard for Defining Substantial Abuse, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1011, 1018 
(1986) (stating that the “language in S. 2000 was incorporated verbatim into             
S. 445”). 
 85. See S. 445, § 202(b) (stating that the court may dismiss a case under Chapter 
7 if granting relief is a substantial abuse of Chapter 7); see also Balser, supra note 84, 
at 1018 (noting that there was no explanation in the legislative history for why a 
“substantial abuse” test replaced a “future income” test). 
 86. See S. 445, § 202(b) (creating a presumption in favor of granting the relief 
requested by the debtor). 
 87. See H.R. 5174, 98th Cong. (1984) (proposing to amend the Bankruptcy Code 
without a future income test). 
 88. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified in various sections of title 11 of the United States Code). 
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test, however, have resulted in courts interpreting “substantial abuse” 
in a myriad of ways.89 
D. Interpretations of “Substantial Abuse” 
The addition of the “substantial abuse” test, codified at 11 U.S.C.   
§ 707(b), limited debtor access to Chapter 7 bankruptcy and is 
currently the standard that courts employ.90  However, the language 
of Section 707(b) has been the source of great interpretative debate.91 
The United States Code does not define “substantial abuse.”92  As a 
result, the courts must develop a definition from the legislative 
history of Section 707(b).93  One of the problems with the 
interpretation of “substantial abuse” is that the amendment to 
Section 707 lacked an official committee report.94  The holding of In 
re Kelly95 compounded this problem.  The court in In re Kelly noted 
that, “[t]o the extent that legislative history may be considered, it is 
the official committee reports that provide the authoritative 
                                                          
 89. See Balser, supra note 84, at 1018-19 (discussing the multiple interpretations 
of substantial abuse under the 1984 Amendment). 
 90. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994 & Supp. 2001) (“After a motion and a hearing, 
the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the United States trustee, but not at 
the request or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an 
individual debtor . . . whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that the 
granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of [Chapter 7— 
Liquidation].”). 
 91. See infra notes 92-117 and accompanying text. 
 92. See, e.g., In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 983 (1989) (explaining that because “the 
term ‘substantial abuse’ is not defined in the Act, the term is subject to judicial 
interpretation); Robert M. Thompson, Comment, Consumer Bankruptcy: Substantial 
Abuse and Section 707 of the Bankruptcy Code, 55 MO. L. REV. 247, 254 (1990) (stating 
that substantial abuse is not defined in the bankruptcy code and has been left to 
judicial interpretation). 
 93. See generally Coulson, supra note 22, at 506-07 (noting that courts have 
encountered interpretive difficulties in attempting to quantify substantial abuse 
under § 707 with legislative history analysis). 
 94. See Thompson, supra note 92, at 251-52 (explaining that no official 
committee report exists for the amendments to § 707, and that this lack of a formal 
legislative history has allowed courts to “rummage through the closet of the 
Congressional Record” to find anything that might provide some interpretative 
guidance); see also Tamara O. Mitchell, Dismissal of Cases Via 11 U.S.C. §707:  Bad Faith 
and Substantial Abuse, 102 COM. L.J. 355, 359 (1997) (highlighting the fact that in 
addition to an absence of official committee reports, there are also conflicting floor 
statements regarding the provision). But see Coulson, supra note 22, at 503-04 (citing 
Susan Block-Lieb’s research stating that after the introduction of the substantial 
abuse language in S. 445, Senator Metzenbaum reported to the Judiciary Committee 
that he had “successfully worked out with the author of this amendment the total 
elimination of the future income language . . . the future income matter is no longer 
in the legislation.”).  Representative Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee during debates on H.R. 5174, inserted into the Congressional Record a 
few days after passage of the bill the statement that the substantial abuse language 
“would not create a future income test.”  Coulson, supra note 22, at 504. 
 95. 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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expression of legislative intent . . . [not the] stray comments by 
individual legislators.”96  Therefore, the interpretation of substantial 
abuse has been a challenging jurisprudential endeavor.97 
Commentators have classified the circuit courts’ interpretations of 
“substantial abuse”98 into three categories.99  The Ninth Circuit, in In 
re Kelly, set forth the first mode of interpretation,100 holding that the 
debtor’s ability to pay was the principal factor to be considered in the 
substantial abuse determination.101  The court noted, however, that an 
inability to pay debts would not “shield a debtor” from dismissal 
under section 707(b) when bad faith was otherwise shown.102  The 
Eighth Circuit developed a similar rule in In re Walton,103 noting that 
while Section 707(b) considers a petitioner’s good faith and unique 
hardships,104 the debtor’s ability to fund a Chapter 13 plan is the 
primary factor in determining substantial abuse.105 
The Sixth Circuit’s holding in In re Krohn106 laid out the second 
mode of interpretation of substantial abuse107  The court assessed two 
factors:108 (1) whether the debtor is seeking a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
                                                          
 96. Id. at 912 n.3 (quoting Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984)). 
 97. See generally Coulson, supra note 22, at 506-07 (noting the varied 
interpretations courts have made in defining substantial abuse). 
 98. See id. at 506-08 (highlighting the several general categories of interpretation 
of substantial abuse under § 707(b)). 
 99. See Thompson, supra note 92, at 256-57 (stating that there are three separate 
modes of judicial interpretation for defining substantial abuse).  Only four of the 
eleven circuit courts have defined substantial abuse under § 707(b), with each having 
a different position on the matter.  Id.  See also Michael D. Bruckman, Note, The 
Thickening Fog of “Substantial Abuse”:  Can 707(a) Help Clear the Air?, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. 
L. REV. 193, 195-98 (1994) (dividing the analysis of substantial abuse into three 
categories:  (1) a Chapter 13 per se approach; (2) a Chapter 13 “plus” approach; and 
(3) a totality of the circumstances approach). 
 100. See 841 F.2d at 914 (concluding that debtors able to repay approximately 
ninety-nine percent of their unsecured debt do not require Chapter 7 protection). 
 101. See id. at 914-15 (noting that the “overwhelming majority of the courts 
considering the issue” have adopted this rule consistent with congressional intent, as 
the committee report on S. 445 indicates). 
 102. Id. at 915. 
 103. See 866 F.2d 981, 982 (8th Cir. 1989) (dismissing a debtor’s Chapter 7 case on 
grounds of substantial abuse because the debtor’s monthly income was $1,818, and 
monthly expenses were $1,321, leaving a surplus of $497 with which the debtor could 
pay off debts under a Chapter 13 plan). 
 104. Id. at 983. 
 105. See id. at 984 (“The primary factor that may indicate substantial abuse is the 
ability of the debtor to repay the debts out of future disposable income.”) (quoting   
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 707.07, at 707-19 (15th ed. 1988)). 
 106. 886 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 107. See id. at 127 (holding that a debtor who had ample future income, a 
financial situation that was not the product of an unforeseen or catastrophic event, 
and had lived on a “catalog of excesses” should have a Chapter 7 filing dismissed for 
substantial abuse). 
 108. See id. at 126-27 (noting that need and honesty are two primary factors in 
ascertaining substantial abuse). 
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for “honest” reasons;109 and (2) whether the debtor is “needy” as 
determined by a debtor’s ability to pay his debts out of future 
earnings.110  The court “cautioned,” however, that a debtor’s 
ineligibility for Chapter 13 relief alone would not be the decisive 
factor in dismissal under section 707(b).111 
The Fourth Circuit, in In re Green,112 established the third mode of 
interpretation.113  Rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s position that ability to 
repay debts is a decisive factor,114 the court pointed to the 1984 
bankruptcy amendments in which Congress rejected a threshold 
future income or ability to repay test.115  The Fourth Circuit then 
adopted a “totality of the circumstances” approach,116 to be applied 
on a case-by-case basis.117  Although an ability to repay debts is a 
primary factor under this approach, it cannot be the sole basis for 
finding that a debtor has substantially abused the process.118 
                                                          
 109. See id. at 126 (highlighting other factors relevant to honesty, including:  
(1) the debtor’s good faith and candor in filing schedules and other documents; 
(2) whether he was engaged in “eve of bankruptcy purchases;” and (3) whether he 
was forced into Chapter 7 by unforeseen or catastrophic events). 
 110. See id. at 126-27 (stating that other factors relevant to need include:  
(1) whether a debtor enjoys a stable source of future income; (2) whether he is 
eligible for adjustment of his debts through Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code; 
(3) whether there are state remedies with the potential to ease his financial 
predicament; (4) the degree of relief obtainable through private negotiations; (5) 
the degree of relief obtainable through private negotiations; and (6) whether a 
debtor’s expenses can be reduced significantly without depriving him of adequate 
food, clothing, shelter and other necessities). 
 111. See id. at 127 (noting that a “bright-line” test would encourage debtors to run 
up unsecured debts in excess of $100,000, thereby avoiding dedication of future 
earnings to debt retirement under Chapter 13). 
 112. 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 113. See id. at 573 (remanding the case to the district court for determination of 
substantial abuse based on a “totality of the circumstances” analysis). 
 114. See id. at 571-72 (rejecting the rule of In re Kelly on the basis that the court in 
that case made an unsupported logical leap in concluding the ability to repay debt is 
a decisive factor in evaluating substantial abuse). 
 115. See id. (noting that the cases supporting the rule established in In re Kelly only 
supported the employment of repayment ability as one of several factors). 
 116. See id. at 572 (noting that employing a totality of the circumstances approach 
allows the court to determine more accurately whether the particular debtor’s case 
invokes the real concern behind Section 707(b)—a debtor abusing the bankruptcy 
process by taking advantage of creditors). 
 117. See id. (stating that the totality of the circumstances approach involves an 
evaluation of factors such as:  “(1) whether the debtor filed the bankruptcy because 
of sudden illness, calamity, disability, or unemployment; (2) whether the debtor 
incurred cash advances and made consumer purchases far in excess of his ability to 
repay; (3) whether the debtor’s proposed family budget is excessive or unreasonable; 
(4) whether the debtor’s schedules and statement of current income and expenses 
reasonably and accurately reflect his financial condition; and (5) whether the debtor 
filed in good faith”). 
 118. See id. (suggesting that while a debtor’s ability to repay may raise an inference 
that there is substantial abuse, it does not by itself demonstrate such abuse). 
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II.  THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 2001:                      FORMULATION 
AND ARTICULATION 
A.  Legislative Formulation of the Reform Act 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 (“Reform Act”) is a 
culmination of several years of congressional work,119 as debate on 
how to reform the system began in 1997.120  The 106th Congress 
passed the Gekas-Grassley Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, which was 
“virtually identical”121 to the Reform Act of 2001.122  However, 
President Clinton pocket-vetoed the conference report on December 
19, 2000.123  Another attempt at reformation in the 107th Congress 
commenced on January 31, 2001, an effort that came to be known as 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001.124  Currently, a conference 
committee is reconciling the House and Senate versions of the 
Reform Act, making it likely that the Act will not face a full vote of 
Congress until 2002.125  
These recent attempts to reform the U.S. bankruptcy system were a 
response to a “bankruptcy crisis”126 in which a record number of 
consumers filed for bankruptcy during a time of economic 
prosperity.127  The source of the crisis is debated:  some suggest it is 
                                                          
 119. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-3, pt. 1, at 3 (2001) (stating that “H.R. 333 is the 
product of more than 3 years of Congressional consideration of bankruptcy reform 
legislation” that included seventeen hearings with testimony from nearly 130 
witnesses, representing “nearly every major constituency in the bankruptcy 
community”). 
 120. See id. (noting that bankruptcy reform legislation began in the 105th 
Congress with the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 that had a 
conference report passed by “veto proof” margins, and was followed by the 106th 
Congress and House Bill 2415). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See generally Gekas-Grassley Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 2415, 106th 
Cong. (2000) (proposing reform to the U.S. consumer bankruptcy system by limiting 
access to Chapter 7 relief to debtors capable of paying a portion of their debts). 
 123. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-3, pt. 1, at 3 (highlighting the demise of the Gekas-
Grassley Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000). 
 124. See Linda Reid, Bankruptcy Reform Legislation, The Good, the Bad and the 
Unknown, 36 ARK. LAW. 17, 17 (2001) (outlining the in-depth legislative history of the 
current bankruptcy reform legislation).  On July 18, 2001, the Senate voted 82-to-16 
to adopt the Senate’s language to the reform measure under the same bill number of 
the House-passed House Bill 333.  See id. (noting that this action made the Senate 
and House versions virtually indistinguishable). 
 125. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting that the Reform Act is 
currently tied up in the House of Representatives on an unrelated amendment 
dealing with bankruptcy treatment of abortion protestors). 
 126. Bermant & Flynn, supra note 15, at 22. 
 127. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (highlighting the irony of having a 
record number of consumers filing for bankruptcy during a time of economic 
prosperity). 
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due to consumer abuse of the system,128 while others contend that 
credit card providers’ aggressive marketing to low-income households 
spawned the crisis.129  Despite this debate, the legislative history of the 
Reform Act indicates that Congress believed that consumer abuse 
caused the crisis.130  Therefore, the Reform Act can be properly 
regarded as an attempt to address and eliminate perceived consumer 
abuse. 
B.  The Legislative Details for Eligibility Under the Reform Act 
The Reform Act131 proposes substantial changes to the current U.S. 
bankruptcy system, as codified at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).132  Structurally, 
the Reform Act changes the “Dismissal” heading of section 707 to 
“Dismissal of a case or conversion to a case under Chapter 11 or 
13.”133  The Act also replaces the debated “substantial abuse” language 
in section 707(b) with only “abuse.”134 
The most important substantive change for consumer debtors, 
however, is that, with the imposition of a means test, the proposed 
reform actually defines “abuse.”135  The means test is significant 
because a debtor now faces a presumption of abuse in every Chapter 
7 filing that fails the means test.136  However, a debtor may still avoid 
dismissal or conversion of a Chapter 7 filing even when he fails the 
means test if his household income is less than the household median 
income for his state of residency.137  The Reform Act of 2001 
                                                          
 128. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (discussing the current 
paradoxical bankruptcy crisis). 
 129. See Stephen Brobeck, Consumer Federation of America:  Recent Trends in Bank 
Credit Card Marketing and Indebtedness, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE,                       
at http://www.abiworld.org/research/cfa_credit_study_7-98.html (July 1998) 
(reporting on studies conducted in 1998 that attempted to ascertain the tendencies 
of the consumer credit industry) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 130. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-3, pt. 1, at 5 (2001) (stating that House Bill 333 was 
formulated to respond to many of the factors contributing to the increase in 
consumer bankruptcy filings, such as lack of personal financial accountability, the 
proliferation of serial filings, and the absence of effective oversight to eliminate 
abuse in the system). 
 131. This Comment will refer to both Senate Bill 420 and House Bill 333 as the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act.  The sections addressing a consumer’s ability to file under 
Chapter 7 are identical under the two versions.  See supra note 124 and accompanying 
text. 
 132. See infra notes 133-158 and accompanying text (elaborating on the changes to 
the United States bankruptcy system).   
 133. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 
333, 107th Cong. § 102 (2001). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See discussion infra Part II.B.1 (noting the details of the means test for a 
debtor’s eligibility to receive a Chapter 7 discharge under the Reform Act). 
 137. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the median income test). 
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essentially provides debtors with two independent tests for eligibility 
under Chapter 7:  (1) a means test and (2) a median income test. 
1.  Test 1:  The means test and defeating the presumption of abuse 
Under the means test, the focus of the judicial inquiry is the 
debtor’s ratio of income to unsecured debt.138  As was mentioned 
above, there is a presumption of abuse applied to all debtors who fail 
the means test.139  The debtor passes the means test only when the 
debtor’s “excess income”—calculated by reducing current monthly 
income140 by specific categories of expenses141 and multiplied by 
sixty—is greater than or equal to the lesser of either:  (1) twenty-five 
percent of the debtor’s non-priority unsecured claims in the case, or 
$6,000, whichever is greater; or (2) $10,000.142  
This complicated test implies that a consumer debtor, regardless of 
debt total, is ineligible for a full Chapter 7 discharge under the 
means test if the amount of their excess income exceeds $10,000.143  
However, if a debtor owes between $24,000 and $48,000 in unsecured 
debt, the excess income figure cannot exceed twenty-five percent of 
the amount owed.144  For those who owe less than $24,000 in 
unsecured debt, their excess income figure must be less than $6,000 
to be eligible for Chapter 7 discharge.145 
Definitions of monthly income and expenses are critical to the 
evaluation of a filing under the means test.  Income is defined as the 
average monthly income the debtor earns during the six-month 
period preceding the date of the determination of eligibility.146  
Expenses are defined in three categories, all of which are deductible 
                                                          
 138. See H.R. Rep. No. 107-3, pt. 1, at 8 (2001) (explaining that Section 102 
implements “need based” bankruptcy reform and permits the court to dismiss a 
Chapter 7 case for abuse if the debt for which the debtor seeks relief is primarily 
consumer debt). 
 139. See id. (discussing the replacement of the current presumption in favor of the 
debtor with a mandatory presumption of abuse triggered by certain criteria). 
 140. See H.R. 333 § 102(b) (defining current monthly income as the average 
income from all sources during the preceding six month period, including any third 
party assistance to household expenses, but excluding Social Security benefits and 
certain other payments); see also supra Part II.B.2 and accompanying text (discussing 
the exception for income below the median level of the debtor’s state of residence). 
 141. See infra notes 148-159 and accompanying text (describing the three 
categories of deductible expenses). 
 142. H.R. 333 § 102(a)(1). 
 143. See id. (characterizing the means test as the criteria for determining whether 
a “grant of relief would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter”). 
 144. See id. (describing the eligibility requirements under the means test) . 
 145. See id. (describing in further detail the treatment of a particular debtor when 
then income dips below a certain threshold). 
 146. Id. 
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against this monthly income determination.147 
The first category of deductible expenses is the debtor’s monthly 
expenses.148  Monthly expenses include and exclude a variety of 
typical living expenses.149  Specifically, the debtor’s monthly expenses 
may include actual expenses the debtor pays that are reasonable and 
necessary for care and support of an elderly, chronically ill, or 
disabled immediate family member150 who would be unable to pay for 
such care otherwise.151  Deductible monthly expenses can also include 
actual expenses up to $1,500 a year for a child to attend a private or 
public elementary or secondary school, provided the child is 
dependent and under the age of eighteen.152  The “debtor’s payments 
for unsecured debts” is the main expense that is not deductible from 
the monthly income determination.153 
The second category of deductible expenses is monthly payments 
on secured debts.154  These payments are the sum of amounts 
contractually due to secured creditors in each of the sixty months 
following the date of the petition, and any additional payments to 
secured creditors necessary to maintain possession of the debtor’s 
primary residence, motor vehicle, or other property that serves as 
collateral for secured debts but is also required to support the debtor 
and the debtor’s dependents.155  That figure is divided by sixty in 
order to get the monthly average, which is deductible from the 
debtor’s total income.156 
                                                          
 147. See infra notes 148-59 and accompanying text (detailing the three categories 
of expenses that are deductible from a debtor’s monthly income determination). 
 148. H.R. 333 § 102(a)(1). 
 149. See id. (explaining that the Internal Revenue Service Financial Analysis 
Handbook sets out “National Standards and Local Standards” and the list of “Other 
Necessary Expenses” in order to calculate acceptable monthly expenses). 
 150. See id. (stating that immediate family members include “parents, 
grandparents, and siblings of the debtor, the dependents of the debtor, and the 
spouse of the debtor in a joint case who is not a dependent”). 
 151. An additional monthly allowance is allowed for food and clothing.  See id. 
(limiting this allowance to five percent of the food and clothing categories specified 
by the National Standards issued by the Internal Revenue Service). 
 152. See id. (noting that the debtor must provide documentation of such expenses 
and a detailed explanation of why such expenses are reasonable and necessary).  If 
the debtor is eligible for Chapter 13, the monthly expenses can include 
administrative expenses of overseeing a Chapter 13 plan for the district in which the 
debtor resides.  See id. (limiting this deductible expense to ten percent of the 
projected plan payments, as determined under schedules issued by the Executive 
Office for United States Trustees). 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. (noting that expenses due to secured creditors are deductible from the 
debtor’s monthly income determination). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
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The third category of deductible expenses includes payments of 
priority debt claims.157  Priority claims typically include payment of 
federal, state, and local taxes, and “administrative expenses incurred 
in administration of the bankruptcy filing.”158  Again, the total 
amount is divided by sixty in order to arrive at the monthly expense 
figure for priority claims, which is deducted from the debtor’s total 
monthly income.159 
Although the Reform Act would allow these three categories of 
expenses to be deducted from income, the court may deduct other 
expenses if they are itemized, documented, and accompanied with a 
detailed explanation of the special circumstances necessitating the 
expenses.160  If a debtor fails to satisfy the means test even with these 
deductions, his fate in Chapter 7 bankruptcy remains dependent 
upon the median income test. 
2. Test 2:  The median income test 
The means test is not a debtor’s only opportunity to obtain a 
Chapter 7 discharge.  Under the Reform Act, if a debtor satisfies the 
median income test, a debtor is allowed to receive a discharge under 
Chapter 7 despite failing the means test.161  The median income test 
compares a debtor’s monthly income with the median monthly 
income in the debtor’s state of residency.162 
If a debtor’s current monthly income, assuming the debtor lives in 
a household of one, when “multiplied by twelve is equal to or less 
than . . . the median family income of the applicable State for one 
earner last reported by the Bureau of the Census,”163 then the debtor 
can still procure a Chapter 7 discharge despite failing of the means 
test.164  In the cases of households with more than one person, the 
filing cannot be dismissed when the household income is less than 
the State’s median family income with the corresponding number of 
                                                          
 157. See id. (stating that payments made on priority claims, such as child support 
and alimony, are deductible from the debtor’s total monthly income). 
 158. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)-(9) (2000) (listing expenses and claims in order of 
priority for a bankruptcy proceeding). 
 159. H.R. 333 § 102(a). 
 160. See id. (creating another exception from the monthly income total for a 
demonstration of special circumstances necessitating additional monthly expenses or 
an adjustment to the monthly income determination).  House Bill 333 clearly 
specifies that there can be no reasonable alternative to the additional expenses in 
order to demonstrate a special circumstance.  Id. 
 161. See id. (explaining that a court can deny a motion to dismiss or convert if the 
debtor’s monthly income multiplied by twelve is between 100 and 150% of the 
median income in the debtor’s state of residency). 
 162. Id. 
 163. H.R. 333 § 102. 
 164. Id. 
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people in the household.165 
For example, a debtor living in the State of Massachusetts with a 
spouse, two children, and a yearly household income of $70,000 will 
be eligible to seek a Chapter 7 discharge regardless of a failure of the 
means test because the median income of a four person household in 
1999 in Massachusetts was $71,689.166  If that same family lived in the 
State of Missouri, however, the debtor would not be eligible for relief 
under the median family income test because the median income for 
a four person household in Missouri in 1999 was $56,673.167  In 
Missouri, the debtor would be ineligible for a discharge under 
Chapter 7, and would be required to withdraw the bankruptcy 
petition or seek relief under a Chapter 13 repayment plan. 
3.  Exceptions:  Special circumstances and bad faith 
As discussed in Part II.B.1-2, an exception for special circumstances 
exists to allow additions to formulations of income and expenses that 
may make a difference in a debtor’s successful passage of either the 
means test or the median income test.168  The court determines 
special exceptions and a debtor must present extensive 
documentation to persuade the court to make special additions or 
subtractions.169 
On the other hand, there is an exception to eligibility for a 
Chapter 7 discharge if there is evidence of bad faith.170  Even if a 
particular debtor meets the requirements of either the means test or 
the median income test, a court can dismiss a Chapter 7 filing or 
convert a filing to Chapter 13 if the court finds that the debtor filed 
the petition in “bad faith” or if the “totality of the circumstances” of 
                                                          
 165. See id. (stating that in the case of a debtor from a household exceeding four 
individuals, the median income will be compared to the highest median family 
income of the applicable State for a family of four or fewer individuals last reported 
by the Bureau of the Census plus $525 per month for each individual in excess of 
four). 
 166. See U.S. Census Bureau, Median Income for 4-Person Families, by State (Mar. 2, 
2002) (providing information regarding four-person family median income by state), 
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/4person.html (last revised Aug. 22, 
2002). 
 167. See id. (revealing that Missouri’s four-person family median income is 
approximately average for the incomes of all fifty states). 
 168. See discussion supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the special circumstances 
exception to the Reform Act). 
 169. See H.R. 333 § 102 (noting that while a determination of special 
circumstances is left to the discretion of the court, extensive documentation 
providing background and supplemental information regarding the special 
circumstances is required before the court begins to employ its discretion). 
 170. See infra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing the bad faith exception 
to the Reform Act). 
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the debtor’s financial situation demonstrates abuse.171 
III.  ANALYSIS:  BANKRUPTCY REFORM AT THE RIGHT TIME                      
AND IN THE RIGHT PLACE 
Critics and supporters of bankruptcy reform have long debated 
measures similar to the Reform Act.  This Part addresses these 
contentions and analyzes the Reform Act in the context of these 
arguments. 
A.  The Legal Justifications:  A Universally Applicable Test 
As noted in Part I.D, the circuit courts have used three different 
tests to determine how to apply the substantial abuse requirement 
under the current system.172  These circuit court cases represent the 
range of the significance that courts place on the ability to repay 
when making a substantial abuse determination.173  Although the 
significance of the ability to repay varies, it is a constant factor 
relevant to any Chapter 7 judicial inquiry.174 
When courts determine a debtor’s ability to pay, they construct a 
“hypothetical Chapter 13 plan for the debtor.”175  Under Chapter 13, 
if the trustee or holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the 
confirmation of a proposed plan, the court cannot confirm the plan 
unless the debtor either pays the claim in full or dedicates all of his 
disposable income176 to the plan for a period of three years.177  Once 
the court determines the monthly disposable income, the amount is 
multiplied by the number of planned payments, which is usually over 
a thirty-six month period.178  The projected amount is a percentage of 
                                                          
 171. See H.R. 333 § 102 (including in the totality of the circumstances analysis 
whether the debtor seeks to reject a personal services contract and the financial need 
for such rejection as sought by the debtor). 
 172. See discussion supra Part I.D (highlighting the three modes of interpretation 
of “substantial abuse”). 
 173. See Mitchell, supra note 94, at 365 (arguing that the four circuit court 
opinions are best viewed on a “continuum with the Ninth Circuit’s Kelly and the 
Eighth Circuit’s Walton at one end, the Fourth Circuit’s Green at the other, and the 
Sixth Circuit’s Krohn somewhere in the middle.”). 
 174. See id. at 368 (stating that “regardless of which test is used, a debtor’s ability to 
pay his debts is relevant to the outcome.”). 
 175. Id. at 368. 
 176. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (1998) (defining disposable income as “income 
which is received by the debtor and which is not reasonably necessary to be 
expended . . . for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the 
debtor. . . .”). 
 177. See id. (explaining that Chapter 13 plans cannot be extended over a longer 
period than three years unless the court extends that period for “cause”). 
 178. See Mitchell, supra note 94, at 369 (describing the process by which disposable 
income is determined over a three-year Chapter 13 plan period). 
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the debt owed and is the focal point for determining ability to 
repay.179 
There is no bright line test for determining what percentage of 
disposable income triggers a presumption of an ability to repay.180  
However, the courts that have set a minimum standard have generally 
held that if a debtor can pay “more than 50% of his/her debts 
through a Chapter 13 plan, [the case is likely to be dismissed] for 
substantial abuse of Chapter 7.”181 
Although a great deal of uncertainty exists as to what clearly 
constitutes an ability to repay under the current structure, the 
Reform Act clarifies this question and imposes a universal legal 
standard.182 Despite the fact that the means test and median income 
test are lengthy and laced with definitional details and exceptions,183 
they provide a common standard by which every individual seeking 
relief under Chapter 7 will be evaluated. 
Critics of the Reform Act argue that the clarity of law is not as ideal 
as one might think,184 positing that an unambiguous provision can 
prevent the judicial system from responding to cases that involve 
abuse yet meet the statutory requirements for a discharge.185  The 
typical example illustrating this proposition is an individual with 
sizable unsecured debts who seeks a full discharge and stops working 
for the six month period prior to determination to reduce his 
monthly income to the point at which he could pass either test for 
eligibility under Chapter 7.186 
This scheme is likely to fail in procuring a discharge under the 
Reform Act for one key reason:  it would trigger the bad faith 
exception, noted in Part II.B.3, and be summarily dismissed.187  
                                                          
 179. See id. at 369-70 (stating that the percentage of disposable income that a 
debtor can pay toward his debts is the decisive factor in ascertaining an ability to pay 
for current substantive abuse determinations). 
 180. See id. (noting that there is always uncertainty as to which court will require 
what percentage in an ability to repay analysis). 
 181. In re Vianese, 192 B.R. 61, 70-71 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996); see also In re Smith, 
No. 94-01953, 1995 WL 20345, at *2 (Bankr. D. Idaho Jan. 11, 1995). 
 182. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1-2 (describing the uniformity of the law 
incident to the means and median income tests). 
 183. See id. (presenting the details of the means and median income tests). 
 184. See Jack F. Williams, Ruminating on the Proposed Bankruptcy Bill, 20-AUG AM. 
BANKR. INST. J. 6, 45 (2001) (noting that most key provisions throttle discretion of 
bankruptcy judges, relegating them to administrators). 
 185. See Reid, supra note 124, at 19 (explaining that “experts anticipate many 
individuals will manipulate their financial status by reducing their present income or 
by artificially inflating their debts in order to qualify for relief under the proposed 
Chapter 7.”). 
 186. See id. (presenting theories on how the debtors can abuse the proposed 
Reform Act). 
 187. See discussion supra Part II.B.3 (describing the bad faith exception to 
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Courts can use the bad faith exception as a safety net to allow the 
judicial system to freely maneuver and intercept suspicious activity 
within the confines of the means test and the median income test.188  
Therefore, the reform provides the best of both worlds: legal clarity 
and enforceable maneuverability. 
B. The Moral and Social Justifications:                                                        
A Fresh Start to Only Those Who Need It 
Although bankruptcy law may appear to be purely economic in 
nature, in many ways it also serves as social legislation.189 Lending 
transactions implicitly include a moral obligation of repayment.190  
This obligation of reciprocity is derived from both social pressures 
and religious doctrines.191  However, in some circumstances an 
individual’s debt repayment is simply impossible.192  Therefore, 
morally speaking, bankruptcy should be a vehicle for forgiving the 
needy while preventing abuse and avoidance of obligations.193 
Avoidance of the moral responsibilities incident to acquisition of 
debt has tremendous implications for society.194  For example, the 
“rejection of economic obligations by filing [for] bankruptcy tears at 
the web of reciprocal relationships that underlies society” and can 
have profound and far-reaching consequences on other areas of 
society.195  Most notably, rejecting these obligations can have a 
                                                          
eligibility under the Reform Act). 
 188. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1-2 (presenting the means and median income 
tests). 
 189. See Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law As Social Legislation, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 
393, 394 (2001) (noting that bankruptcy law essentially creates a system of “legalized 
post-contractual opportunism” that is only justified by the moral principle that an 
honest but unfortunate debtor is entitled to discharge their debts). 
 190. See id. at 397-98 (explaining the web of reciprocal promises between lender 
and borrower symbolizes the essence of humanity causing people to feel a natural 
affinity to satisfy their promises and expect the same from others); see also Rafael 
Efrat, The Moral Appeal of Personal Bankruptcy, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 141, 162-67 (1998) 
(discussing how many religions encourage debt repayment and the avoidance of 
bankruptcy). 
 191. See Zywicki, supra note 189 at 398-99 (noting that Christianity, Islam, Judaism, 
and Hinduism foster in their believers a moral code emphasizing the importance of 
debt repayment and the avoidance of bankruptcy).  For example, the Golden Rule is 
“a rule that exemplifies the reciprocity that underlies the social and economic 
system.”  Id. at 398. 
 192. See id. at 398-99 (implying that despite these religious commands there are 
always situations when reciprocity is not possible and the debtor’s moral obligation of 
reciprocity is no longer required). 
 193. See id. at 399 (discussing bankruptcy’s tension between helping the needy and 
avoiding abuses of the system’s benefits). 
 194. See infra notes 195-206 and accompanying text (describing the social 
implications of debt avoidance). 
 195. Zywicki, supra note 189, at 400, 405.  Zywicki  espouses that a healthy, free, 
and prosperous society can be imagined as a “three-legged” stool in which all three 
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negative impact on efficient economic activity by undermining trust 
in transactions.196  When there is a lack of social trust in an economy, 
more resources are needed to monitor and enforce promises, thus 
preventing economic expansion.197  Additionally, in order for 
democracy and the rule of law to prosper, social trust and reciprocity 
must be maintained.198  This rule of law is “rooted in notions of 
reciprocity, namely that political leaders and subjects owe reciprocal 
obligations to one another.”199  If the foundation of reciprocity is 
undermined, political obligations, such as in democracies, weaken.200  
Without reciprocity, majorities would create systems of repression, 
rather than freedom. 
Evidence of this symbiotic relationship can also be demonstrated 
on an individual level; an individual’s ability to break promises, in the 
form of debt avoidance, may “spill over” and corrupt the individual’s 
responsibility and reciprocity in other areas of life.201  Additionally, 
                                                          
legs are necessary for society to prosper.  Id. at 400-01.  The three legs are “(1) a 
market economy, (2) democratic politics under a rule of law, and (3) healthy 
institutions of civil society that inculcate habits of reciprocity and personal 
responsibility in one’s citizens.”  Id.  Each leg is dependent upon the strength of the 
other legs, and each must work together with the other legs to bear the burden of 
supporting freedom, prosperity, and individual happiness.  Id.  Therefore, when the 
“leg” of reciprocity and personal responsibility are undermined by an easily 
accessible bankruptcy system, the other legs of the stool are affected.  Id. 
 196. See id. at 401-02 (discussing how suspicion and irresponsibility are not found 
in the most prosperous economies because economic rewards come to citizens who 
fulfill their duties of morality). 
 197. See id. (stating that societies with higher degrees of social trust tend to grow 
faster economically and are wealthier than low-trust societies because fewer resources 
are used to monitor and enforce promises and leaving increased resources for 
economic expansion). 
 198. See id. at 403 (“[The] concept [of reciprocity] underlies the birth of the 
concept of the rule of law in Western Europe and its eventual evolution into the 
concept of constitutions that bind sovereign and subjects alike.”). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. at 403-04 (noting that weak relations of morality and civil society 
provide “shallow soil for planting the seeds of economic and political freedom”).  
Poland offers evidence that strong moral and civil relations stimulate economic 
growth because the transition there to a free market economy and democratic 
politics can be attributed to the flourishing Catholic Church and labor unions, 
despite previous Communist control.  Id.  In Poland, these institutions “provided a 
structure of morality and institutional legitimacy that inculcated the social trust on 
which economic and political freedom could grow.”  Id. 
 201. Id. at 405.  There is a strong correlation between bankruptcy filing rates and 
divorce rates suggesting that bankruptcy and divorce are caused by an individual’s 
inability to keep promises when obligations become costly or difficult to maintain.  
See id. (noting this thesis should be distinguished from the argument that divorce 
causes bankruptcy by creating financial distress; the argument here is that 
bankruptcy and divorce correlate when measured against the independent variable 
of an individual’s propensity to break promises); see also F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. 
Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 205 (1998) (analyzing statistical 
data indicating that social variables, such as divorce coefficients, complete the 
analysis of bankruptcy filing rates). 
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unchecked irresponsible behavior may tacitly encourage similar 
behavior in persons associated with bankruptcy filers.202  As a result, 
there is little incentive for an individual to sacrifice by living within 
his means while the neighbor next door lives extravagantly and is free 
of financial burdens with little or no consequence.203  A bankruptcy 
system that promulgates the moral obligations of reciprocity and 
responsibility will ensure that the social consequences discussed 
above are avoided. 
The Reform Act reinforces these moral obligations by 
implementing the means test, which addresses morally repugnant 
discharges by limiting Chapter 7 filing to needy debtors.204  Studies 
have estimated that anywhere between one205 and five206 billion dollars 
annually can be repaid by debtors, who under current law, receive a 
total discharge of debts.  This range of repayable debt represents 
numerous broken promises that weigh down society.  The institution 
of the means test will aid in insuring that debts are repaid and the 
ideals of reciprocity are pursued.  The median income test, on the 
other hand, will help to insure that the needy have an avenue of 
recourse at their disposal.  Therefore, both moral objectives of 
bankruptcy are fulfilled. 
                                                          
 202. See Zywicki, supra note 189, at 406-07 (noting that the current bankruptcy 
system rewards irresponsible behavior and penalizes individuals living within their 
means; consequently, more and more Americans end up walking away from their 
debts rather than facing the challenge of living within their means and fulfilling their 
responsibilities). 
 203. See id. (noting that current consumer bankruptcy trends contradict the 
morality of Aesop’s fable of the grasshopper and the ant that highlighted the 
importance of planning ahead, diligent saving, and a strong work ethic).  
 204. See discussion supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (detailing the means 
test). 
 205. See GORDON BERMANT & ED FLYNN, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. TRUSTEES, 
INCOMES, DEBTS, AND REPAYMENT CAPACITIES OF RECENTLY DISCHARGED CHAPTER 7 
DEBTORS 5 (1999), at http://www.abiworld.org/legis/reform/eoust-99jan.html 
(considering a variety of factors that would reduce the amount over median income 
debtors could repay; the authors concluded that approximately $1 billion could be 
repaid annually through a means test) (on file with the American University Law 
Review).  See also Marianne B. Culhane & Michael M. White, Taking the New Consumer 
Bankruptcy for a Test Drive:  Means-Testing for Real Chapter 7 Debtors 2, at http://www.abi 
world.org/research/creightonstudy.html (1998) (uncovering similar amounts of an 
additional four billion dollars, to the Bermant/Flynn study that could be repaid by 
over-median income debtors) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 206. See J. Barron & M. Staten, Personal Bankruptcy:  A Report on Petitioners’ Ability to 
Pay, CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY (1997) (basing findings on 
2,441 Chapter 7 cases filed during 1996 in thirteen cities); see also Gordon Bermant & 
Ed Flynn, Incomes, Debts, and Repayment Capacities of Recently Discharged Chapter 7 
Debtors, American Bankruptcy Institute (July 8, 1999) (basing results on a study 
including 2,220 cases drawn from all ninety judicial districts that were filed during 
1997) (citing T. Neubig & F. Scheuren, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petitioners’ Ability to Repay:  
the National Perspective, ERNST & YOUNG L.L.P. (1998)), available at 
http://www.abiworld.org/ legis/reform/eoust-99jan.html. 
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In terms of the individual, the Reform Act will provide statutory 
incentives for debtors to live within their financial means by 
eliminating the tantalizing allure of frivolous and liability-free 
spending.207  By living within one’s means, there is a tacit promotion 
of personal responsibility in other areas of life.  Therefore, the 
Reform Act will not only stop the “bleeding” caused by current law,208 
but also help to promote a systemic sense of an individual’s moral 
obligations to repay his debt. 
C. The Economic Justification:                                                        
Promoting the Availability of Affordable Consumer Credit 
As the U.S. economy lingers in a recession, the economic impact of 
the bankruptcy reform becomes increasingly important.209  As critics 
of the Act have emphasized, at a time of economic retraction, the last 
thing consumers need is a bankruptcy reform that limits their access 
to Chapter 7 relief.210  However, the Reform Act may actually stave off 
the growth of a potentially harmful economic reality:  the 
unavailability of consumer credit. 
A primary concept in lending transactions is the distribution of risk 
and the maximization of profits.211  A primary rule in this regard is 
                                                          
 207. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1-2 (describing how the means and median 
income tests will help reduce the amount of debtors who may be able to repay a 
portion of their debt). 
 208. See discussion supra Part I.C (describing current consumer bankruptcy 
eligibility). 
 209. Greg Ip, It’s Official:  Economy Is in a Recession, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2001, at 
A2.  According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the United States 
economy slipped into a recession during March of 2001.  Id.  The Bureau defines a 
recession as a “widespread decline in economic activity lasting more than a few 
months,” and is determined by assessing a variety of factors including “industrial 
production, employment, real incomes, minus government benefits, and real 
wholesale and retail sales.”  Id. 
 210. See American Bankruptcy Institute, Today’s Bankruptcy Headlines:  Sept. 11 Plays 
Role in Opinions During Bankruptcy Panel Meeting, Daily Bankruptcy Review (Nov. 15, 
2001), at http://www.abiworld.org/headlines/TODAY.html (citing Senator Paul 
Wellstone’s statement that “[i]n the best of times, this bill would be terrible for 
consumers and regular working class families, but its effects will be all the more 
devastating now that we have a weakening economy.”) (on file with the American 
University Law Review).  House Judiciary Committee ranking member John Conyers 
noted that “[w]hile our nation is engaged in a recession and has a military 
engagement abroad, I strongly object to what is about to happen in this 
conference . . . [while] the economy is shrinking.  Half a million people lost their 
jobs last month and more are losing them each day.”  Id. 
 211. Rocco I. Debitetto, Comment, Bankruptcy Reform in Light of Increased Consumer 
Filings:  Means-Testing Employed to Prevent Long-Run Economic Impacts on Consumers and 
to Cure Debtor Abuse Under the Current Bankruptcy Code, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 641, 646-47 
(2001) (highlighting the “bedrock” economic principle that “‘individuals and firms 
engaged in consumer credit transactions always act as profit maximizers’”) (quoting 
Phillip Shuchman, Theory and Reality in Bankruptcy:  The Spherical Chicken, 41 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 66, 71 (1977)).  These maximized profits are directly and positively 
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that the cost of lending is directly proportional to consumer interest 
rates and inversely proportional to the quantity of funds supplied by 
creditors.212  The cost of lending is “alternative lending opportunities 
foregone in lieu of making a loan to a consumer, many of which may 
be less risky.”213  Applying the aforementioned rule, the riskier the 
consumer loan, the higher the interest rates will be and as a result, 
creditors will be more hesitant to fund these risky loans.214 
Applying these two concepts to the current bankruptcy crisis, it 
becomes evident that the current situation is not favorable for 
consumers.215  The primary risk for a consumer lender is that the 
borrower will enter into bankruptcy.216  With the current bankruptcy 
system in which Chapter 7 discharges are on the rise as a result of 
debtor abuse, the risk for lenders increases proportionally.217  As the 
risk grows, the interest rates for consumer loans rises and the quantity 
of funds available for loans decreases.218  In the end, the costs will be 
passed on to the consumer.219 
The sluggish economy compounds the problem for consumers.220  
Increased lending costs and decreased credit availability are the last 
thing that an economy desperately seeking an influx of consumer 
spending needs.221  If credit is harder and costlier to obtain, 
                                                          
correlated to risk.  William H. Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy:  
The Role of the State, 41 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 21 n.20 (1977). 
 212. See Meckling, supra note 211, at 16, 21 (explaining that the funds available to 
a particular group of borrowers is completely elastic when interest rates are 
appropriately set within that market).  Thus, when a consumer has a higher risk 
coefficient, interest rates will be higher but the market for funds will remain 
responsive to shifts in the supply and demand curves.  Id. at 21.  As profit maximizers, 
lenders have a strong incentive to minimize administrative costs and mitigate any 
possible losses from insolvent borrowers.  Id. at 22. 
 213. Debitetto, supra note 211, at 647. 
 214. See id. at 648 (expounding upon the role of lenders as profit maximizers in 
pursuing a “riskless” rate of return and requiring sufficient compensation for risks 
beyond a minimum threshold of risk). 
 215. See infra notes 216-24 and accompanying text (indicating how the current 
situation indicates that the cost of consumer credit will increase and the supply will 
decrease). 
 216. See Debitetto, supra note 211, at 649 (explaining that this risk will, in turn, be 
passed on to consumers by raising the interest rates on loans). 
 217. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (describing the recent rise in 
consumer bankruptcy filings). 
 218. See Debitetto, supra note 211, at 647-48 (presenting the “distribution of risk” 
equation). 
 219. See id. at 649 (estimating that the loss passed on to consumers in the form of 
higher interest rates approaches a revolving balance of $300 per household 
annually). 
 220. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (highlighting data indicating the 
current situation of the U.S. economy). 
 221. See Debitetto, supra note 211, at 650 (noting that the long term impact of an 
increase in credit prices or a reduction in available credit will adversely affect the 
overall economy). 
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consumers will be forced to cut back on purchasing “big ticket” items, 
such as vacations, requiring the use of unsecured credit.222  The 
reduction in consumer spending lowers business sales and profits and 
exacerbates the current economic conditions the United States 
faces.223  As a result, businesses trim their payrolls in order to budget 
for this decrease in sales and more consumers lose their jobs.224 
Implementation of the Reform Act is a step towards assuring that 
those circumstances do not materialize.  The Reform Act’s means test 
will restrict Chapter 7 discharges and therefore, decrease creditor 
risk.225  The size of this risk reduction is arguable.  Reports indicate 
that the creditors would annually recover anywhere from one to five 
billion dollars due to implementation of the means and median 
income tests.226  Whatever the actual figure turns out to be, it will still 
be a sizable return of money and a proportionate decrease in creditor 
risk.227 
Applying the economic theory of risk mentioned above,228 the 
borrowing rates of creditors should decrease in proportion to 
creditor risk, while the amount of available credit will increase 
because the quantity of funds is inversely proportional to the creditor 
risk.229  Therefore, the Reform Act will help to ensure that, over the 
long-run, consumers will have the affordable, unsecured credit 
necessary to buy those “big ticket” items that will help reinvigorate 
the economy.230 
Critics have been quick to point out that despite the recent rise in 
consumer bankruptcy filings, credit card companies have not 
responded with rate increases.231  Although the data provided by the 
                                                          
 222. See id. (explaining that state usury laws will not stop lenders from recouping 
costs through additional surcharges or increased annual fees). 
 223. See generally RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 483-501 (7th ed. 1984) 
(discussing macroeconomic theory as it relates to unemployment and the impact 
unemployment has on an efficiently running economy). 
 224. See id. (discussing the impact that a reduction in consumer spending will have 
on employment rates). 
 225. See discussion supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the means test). 
 226. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text (citing studies identifying the 
amount of debt that creditors could recoup with the implementation of the means 
test). 
 227. See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text (explaining the relationship 
between creditor risk and the cost and availability of credit). 
 228. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 229. See Debitetto, supra note 211, at 650 (discussing the impact of the 
“distribution of risk” analysis on the current economy if the means test is not 
implemented). 
 230. See id. at 647-50 (connecting rampant bankruptcy with a decrease in 
affordable or available unsecured credit). 
 231. See Brobeck, supra note 129 (presenting data indicating that credit rates 
remain at a consistent rate of eighteen percent despite the increase risk of default 
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Consumer Federation of America supports this assertion,232 the data 
does not prove that this Comment’s argument that rates will rise in 
the future is inapplicable.  In the short term, consumer credit 
suppliers are likely to accept the increased risk incident to the rise in 
consumer filings because “creditors are slow to change lending 
patterns to adjust to the increased cost of lending.”233  This result 
explains the lack of change in the cost of consumer credit over the 
past few years, and supports the argument that rates may rise in the 
future. 
Once this equation is factored into a long-term analysis, it appears 
that the worst is yet to come for consumers.  Consumer lenders, while 
slow to react to the increased cost of risk, will eventually respond and 
adjust rates accordingly to take into consideration the risk factor.234  
Therefore, it appears as though further harm to consumers is 
imminent.235  Further, there is evidence indicating that consumers 
may already be out of time.  The Consumer Federation of America 
study, which concluded that credit rates have remained steady the last 
few years, conceded that “banks have raised prices for some of their 
riskiest customers.”236 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:                                            PASS 
THE LEGISLATION AND LET THE HEALING BEGIN! 
As the economy lingers in a recession237 and the number of 
consumer bankruptcies continues to spiral out of control,238 it is clear 
that something needs to be done.  This Comment strongly urges 
Congress to pass, and President Bush to sign, the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 2001 as soon as possible for three reasons.  First, through the 
imposition of the Reform Act’s means and median income tests, the 
current law on eligibility under consumer bankruptcy will become 
                                                          
under the current bankruptcy system). 
 232. See id. (presenting data that indicates no short-term rate effect incident to the 
increased risk in the extension of consumer credit). 
 233. Debitetto, supra note 211, at 648. 
 234. See id. at 648-49 (noting that, in a long-run analysis, lenders will eventually 
adjust their rates to reflect any increased costs of lending). 
 235. See Jack F. Williams, Distrust:  The Rhetoric and Reality of Means-Testing, 7 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 105, 107 (1999) (noting arguments that the current American 
bankruptcy system essentially imposes an annual $400 “bankruptcy tax” on 
consumers by passing on increased costs of lending incurred by creditors to 
consumers). 
 236. Brobeck, supra note 129. 
 237. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (presenting data illustrating the 
condition of the U.S. economy). 
 238. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (citing the seventy-two percent rise 
in consumer bankruptcy filings between 1994 and 1998).  
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clear and unified.239  Second, the Reform Act’s means test and 
median income test restrict morally and socially repugnant 
bankruptcy discharges while ensuring that debtors deserving a “fresh 
start” actually receive one.240  Third, by restricting access to Chapter 7 
bankruptcy through the means test, the costs of lending will decrease, 
thereby increasing consumer spending that can aid in reinvigorating 
the economy.241 
U.S. bankruptcy law has come a long way from its inception at the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787.242  Throughout history, it has 
been tailored to meet the needs and problems of society.243  It has 
become increasingly evident that now is the time for another           
re-adaptation so that our bankruptcy law can be responsive to the 
economic problems facing our country today.  The Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 2001 is that needed and appropriate re-adaptation. 
                                                          
 239. See discussion supra Part III.A (presenting a uniform legal standard as a 
justification for enacting the Reform Act). 
 240. See discussion supra Part III.B (presenting the facilitation of reciprocity as a 
social justification for enacting the Reform Act). 
 241. See discussion supra Part III.C (presenting the preservation of available and 
affordable consumer credit as an economic justification for enacting the Reform 
Act). 
 242. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (establishing “uniform laws of bankruptcy”). 
 243. See discussion supra Part I (presenting a historical analysis of the U.S. 
bankruptcy system). 
